Cultures of Rioting and Anti-Systemic Politics in Southern Europe
Aikaterini Andronikidou & Iosif Kovras

Version of record first published: 05 Jul 2012

To cite this article: Aikaterini Andronikidou & Iosif Kovras (2012): Cultures of Rioting and Anti-Systemic Politics in Southern Europe, West European Politics, 35:4, 707-725

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.682342

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Cultures of Rioting and Anti-Systemic Politics in Southern Europe

AIKATERINI ANDRONIKIDOU and IOSIF KOVRAS

The article investigates why, despite similar background conditions, Greece has been the site of frequent, highly visible, fringe, anti-system politics and street riots, while similar phenomena are rare in Spain. Although the article’s focal point is the eruption of the December 2008 riots in Athens, it sheds light on the two countries’ diverse social reactions to the sovereign debt crisis. Deploying the tool of media framing, it argues that historical legacies and political cultures matter. In the Greek case, the transition to democracy shaped a political ‘culture of sympathy’ towards acts of resistance to the state, a culture that has been institutionalised since the mid-1970s.

Greek Riots

On 6 December 2008, Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a 15-year-old schoolboy, was shot dead by a policeman in Exarchia, a bohemian district of Athens that hosts sizeable anarchist and libertarian communities. News of the incident spread quickly among young people who used new technologies, such as blogs, websites and SMS, to organise a forceful reaction. The rioting that followed was of unprecedented magnitude. Schoolchildren, students, migrants, anarchists and members of extra-parliamentary radical left groups were among the rioters. The riots lasted several days; hundreds of petrol bombs were thrown at the police, banks and state buildings, and there were numerous incidents of looting and violence. The rioters even looted the shop of the parents of the schoolboy shot by the police (Kathimerini 2008). The wrath of the rioters peaked when, in a symbolic act, they burned a Christmas tree in front of the Greek parliament. A spill-over of the protest occurred at Greek embassies in various EU capitals, staged predominantly by Greek students studying abroad. In brief, the Athenian riots signified a
‘turning point’ in the return of ‘street politics’ to contemporary Greece (Economides and Monastiriotis 2009). This has been especially noticeable since the implementation of tough austerity measures that accompanied Greece’s economic bailout by the EU and the IMF in 2010.

The Greek Puzzle

The states in the southern periphery of the Euro-area have been greatly affected by the sovereign debt crisis. Despite the EU bailout, Greece is on the brink of default, while the Spanish government has imposed severe austerity measures to manage its enormous sovereign debt. Despite similar background conditions, Greek and Spanish governments and societies have reacted quite differently. The vocal, yet non-violent, mobilisation of the Spanish ‘May 15’ (15-M) movement stands in sharp contrast to Greece’s repertoire of contention that includes rioting (El País 2011).

Understanding what causes violent riots in a consolidated democracy like Greece may help us predict when street politics and other unconventional forms of protest are likely to occur in other Western European societies. To this end, the paper juxtaposes two countries with comparable background conditions, Spain and Greece, focusing on the puzzling emergence of riots in Greece and the absence of violent collective action in Spain. In their recent history, both have experienced military control preceded by a divisive civil war. In both, the conclusion of an authoritarian period was followed by transitions to democracy. They entered the European Union almost simultaneously – Greece in 1981 and Spain in 1986. More recently, they have struggled with enormous sovereign debt, deep recession and increasing unemployment. They are also transit points for immigrants seeking access to Western Europe and thus have sizeable immigrant communities. Furthermore, both share a vibrant tradition of left-wing grassroots movements, as evidenced by the lengthy tenures in office of their respective socialist parties.

Despite these similarities, in December 2008 Greece faced an intense and violent anti-systemic movement with widespread rioting; this has not happened in Spain, despite skyrocketing (youth) unemployment. Why is Greece so different, given similar economic, social and political conditions?

The paper begins with a discussion of alternative explanations, including structural, institutional and electoral factors, as found in the literatures on street protest, riots and contentious politics, all of which fail convincingly to account for the Greek paradox. It then offers a two-level explanation. First, it shows how the Greek transition to democracy shaped a political ‘culture of sympathy’ to acts of resistance against the state. Second, it notes the mechanisms through which daily practices of resistance have become institutionalised and permeated Greek culture. It concludes that the cultivation of a political culture of sympathy has become a ‘winning formula’ adopted by vocal minorities who deploy unlawful protests. Equally, early socialisation into unlawful practices creates the conditions
for the public to turn a blind eye to the use of violence. In Spain, by contrast, there is no such tolerance of violence.

**Alternative Explanations**

A central problem in the literature on riots, reflecting a flaw in the broader study of political violence, is the absence of a comprehensive understanding of the determinants of political violence (Kalyvas *et al.* 2008). Scholars from different disciplines approach the topic from different angles. Although seminal studies on riots have been published, they tend to focus on specific categories of unrest such as immigrant, religious and ethnic riots (Dancygier 2009; Horowitz 2003; Wilkinson 2004). The literature offers a plethora of theoretical explanations as to why collective action takes unconventional and violent forms, ranging from irrational and psychological to structural and demographic factors (Gurr 1970; Le Bon 1897). These explanations can be grouped into three categories (for a comprehensive review see Wilkinson 2009).

The first group of explanations focuses on the casual relationship between structural and material factors and violent action. According to this approach, social inequality is the root cause of rioting (Bethke and Bussman 2011). Relative deprivation theory posits that the feeling of grievance and injustice resulting from the gap between anticipated and actual gains is the most significant determinant of violent collective action (Gurr 1970). Although relative deprivation is only one of many structuralist and materialist explanations, the core argument remains similar across this group’s critical spectrum: social inequality, absence of opportunities for social integration and economic scarcity cause riots.

This argument cuts across the literature and is widespread in popular and media circles (Auyero 2001; Ponticelli and Voth 2011). Table 1 presents several crude economic indicators, including GDP per capita, level of unemployment and minimum wage in Greece and Spain in 2008. At first glance, the table adds little empirical evidence to the structural argument, since basic economic indicators portray a comparable picture for the two countries. In fact, Greece had a slightly higher GDP per capita, lower unemployment and a virtually identical minimum wage. Indeed, inflation and growth rates reveal that, in the period preceding the riots, Greeks

**TABLE 1**

**BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic economic indicators</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (2008)</td>
<td>€17,505</td>
<td>€15,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (2008)</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage (2008)</td>
<td>€681</td>
<td>€700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (average annual % change 2006–2008)</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth (average annual % change of real GDP 2006–2008)</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: IMF, EUROSTAT and OECD.*
enjoyed slightly superior purchasing power. Therefore, the eruption of violent collective action in Greece does not conform to the claims of materialist theories, although more rigorous empirical evidence of the socio-economic background of the rioters would be needed to carry out a definitive test.

The second set of explanations argues that, although material issues may be important, violent collective action is triggered by a feeling of ‘injustice’ linked to an overall mistrust of institutions. Briefly stated, when state institutions are weak and the state fails to perform its fundamental duties effectively, the incentives for groups to deploy unconventional methods to affect policymaking greatly increase (Machado et al. 2011). When state institutions do not settle disputes (Huntington 1968) and their control mechanisms break down, citizens take more direct forms of collective action (Olzak 1992; Useem 1998). To examine the plausibility of these arguments, Table 2 shows the perception of the quality of the rule of law, government effectiveness and voice and accountability in Spain and Greece in the period between 2006 and 2008. The table draws on the Worldwide Governance Indicators produced by the World Bank which gives all countries a grade from extremely weak (−2.5) to strong (2.5). A thread linking Spain and Greece is the perception of governmental ineffectiveness and the overall lack of trust in state institutions. Corruption is the only indicator where Greece, at almost 0, is markedly different from Spain (1.1). Traditionally, corruption is linked to the sense of justice in a country. Moreover, comparative empirical evidence derived from World Values Survey of 1999 shows that 58.7 per cent of Spaniards had little or no confidence in the justice system; in Greece, the percentage was equally high (56.3 per cent) (World Values Survey 2009). In other words, dysfunctional institutions and ineffective governmental policies alone do not explain why there was an eruption of collective action in Greece but not in Spain.

Wilkinson (2009: 336) rightly argues that ‘group calculations about engaging in collective action are also shaped by the state’s preventive or coercive action’, namely, the level of opposition they expect to encounter. Earlier research on ethnic riots has noted the pivotal role played by the state in triggering or preventing collective action (Horowitz 2003). A similar argument is proffered by the literature on contentious politics, which highlights the importance of external ‘political opportunities’, most notably

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank.*
the role of the state, in triggering collective action (Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1995). What determines the willingness of governments to intervene in certain contexts but not in others is crucial here. In a study of Hindu–Muslim riots in India, Wilkinson (2004) highlights the electoral cost–benefit calculations of governments. In the Indian case, whether rioters represented critical constituents of a party in (a coalition) government was a significant determinant in the decision to abstain from repressing protesters (ibid.). Yet electoral costs and benefits are shaped by public attitudes towards the implementation of law and order. As the Spanish and Greek experiences illustrate, political cleavages take shape during periods of violence, and over time they become embedded. Positive or negative perceptions of these violent legacies determine the electoral costs to a government. It is highly unlikely that government will suppress collective political action if it meets with widespread public sympathy.

Considerations of cost also apply to the protesters and are shaped by previous experience; participants in collective action often opt for familiar practices because this minimises the likelihood of unexpected costs. This is particularly relevant in the Greek case, where the perceived cost of rioting is low, not only because of police inefficiency but also because of the organisational experience of militant groups. In the aftermath of the riots in Rome in October 2011, an anonymous rioter revealed in an interview that he got an ‘MSc in Rioting’ on the streets of Athens (To Vima 2011).

Further ethnographic research is needed show how practices of resistance against the state are perpetuated and reproduced. Although this article acknowledges the importance of other contextual (economic, political, social) factors, it highlights the central role of culture in the adoption of specific repertoires of actions, (high/low) levels of public sympathy, and how societies set their threshold of ‘injustice’. To discern the causal mechanism that transforms culture into political outcomes, we draw on studies of the transition to democracy and political institutions.

**Culture of Sympathy**

The literature on democratisation agrees that political culture and the design of the democratic institutions of a society in transition are shaped by past experience (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5). The transition process itself and the process of learning (Bermeo 1992) combine to explain how political cultures in Greece and Spain shape their respective collective action.

The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) was followed by the victory of the nationalist forces and the prolonged dictatorship of General Franco (1939–1975). An established body of research has shown how the traumatic experiences of the civil war informed the priorities of the political leaders who carried out the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s (Aguilar 2002). The diagnosis that the primary cause of the civil war – and the ensuing 40-year dictatorship – was the inability of the Second Republic
(1931–1936) to maintain stability convinced political elites of the virtues of consensus. Therefore, Spain experienced a ‘paradigmatic’ transition founded on consensus among political leaders. It has been argued that the ‘pacted’ nature of the transition shaped the basic features of Spanish political culture, especially its propensity for consensus and ideological moderation (Martín 2005). These elements – believed to safeguard the success of the transition – became integral to Spanish political life, from nascent institutions, to electoral engineering (promoting coalition governments), to accommodating the ‘Nationalities’ (Field and Hamman 2008).

While Spain cultivated consensus, the Greek transition was rather different. The Greek junta (1967–1974) collapsed after its forceful intervention in the domestic politics of the Republic of Cyprus, followed by a short-lived coup and the invasion of the island by the Turkish army. The transition thus represented a ‘clean break’, reflected in the design of the political institutions, the low level of proportionality of the electoral system, and the unilateral decisions of Prime Minister Karamanlis on issues of transitional justice (Sotiropoulos 2010). Hence, in sharp contrast to the Spanish negotiated transition which set the stage for the cultivation of a culture of compromise, in Greece the ‘clean break’ institutionalised a ‘winner takes all’ mentality in a political culture characterised by non-consensus/non-compromise. Every society institutionalises and reproduces those practices perceived conducive to producing desirable outcomes. Thus, in Spain consensus became institutionalised, while in Greece a culture of ‘resistance’ emerged. Spanish political elites quickly realised that the deployment of a ‘vocal’ repertoire of protest by social, political or professional groups would endanger overarching priorities during democratic consolidation. In fact, although mobilisation was quite high during the early days of the transition, the murderous attacks against left-wing protesters in 1977 and the unsuccessful coup on 23 February 1981 (F-23) had a moderating effect on the demands of all groups. It should be noted that the terrorist activities of the Basque ETA also posed a considerable challenge to the stability of the regime.

Meanwhile, in Greece protesting, rioting and resisting authority form part of a deep-rooted culture of resistance. The predominant narrative of the transition provides useful insights into Greek political culture. For example, it reserves a special place for the student uprising of 17 November 1973 in the National Technical University of Athens – commonly called the ‘Polytechnic’. Although accurate survey data are missing, it is not far-fetched to argue that the uprising set in motion a series of events that led to the Cyprus debacle and the collapse of the dictatorship. In fact, although mobilisation was quite high during the early days of the transition, the murderous attacks against left-wing protesters in 1977 and the unsuccessful coup on 23 February 1981 (F-23) had a moderating effect on the demands of all groups. It should be noted that the terrorist activities of the Basque ETA also posed a considerable challenge to the stability of the regime.

Meanwhile, in Greece protesting, rioting and resisting authority form part of a deep-rooted culture of resistance. The predominant narrative of the transition provides useful insights into Greek political culture. For example, it reserves a special place for the student uprising of 17 November 1973 in the National Technical University of Athens – commonly called the ‘Polytechnic’. Although accurate survey data are missing, it is not far-fetched to argue that the uprising set in motion a series of events that led to the Cyprus debacle and the collapse of the dictatorship. In fact, although mobilisation was quite high during the early days of the transition, the murderous attacks against left-wing protesters in 1977 and the unsuccessful coup on 23 February 1981 (F-23) had a moderating effect on the demands of all groups. It should be noted that the terrorist activities of the Basque ETA also posed a considerable challenge to the stability of the regime.
The memory of the Polytechnic has made two overlapping contributions to the cultivation of a culture of resistance. First, the protesting youth acquired independent agency. Only the student movement overtly resisted the dictatorship. Second, the memory of the Polytechnic has institutionalised the individual’s ‘duty to resist authority’ (Kalyvas 2008). Since the 1970s, 17 November has been a day of remembrance and a school holiday, and an annual memorial is conducted in the Polytechnic to pay tribute to those who died, whose precise number has never been established. These cultural elements help explain why the public was so sensitive to the 2008 event that triggered rioting. The victim was a teenager, and the murder occurred in Exarheia, an Athenian suburb where anarchist, libertarian and other anti-authority groups are located – a flammable mix.

Thus, political culture – influenced by the nature of the transition to democracy – explains the absence of violent collective action in Spain where ideological moderation and consensus have become central features of Spanish political culture. At the same time, in Greece the transition led to a culture of ‘resistance’. However, culture here refers to the origins (transition) and the vocabulary (political discourse of the 1970s). What explains the persistence and reproduction of these practices?

Framing by the Media

Spilerman (1970) illustrates the importance of the media in spreading rumours about violent incidents, thereby inciting ‘riot contagion’. Media analysis can shed light on how news of the December 2008 riots in Athens was transmitted. To this end, the paper draws on the analytical tool of media framing. To frame an event is to ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations’ (Entman 1993: 52). Framing is not a reflection of reality, but a simplification of a ‘perceived reality’ (Loizides 2009). In essence, it represents a deliberate effort by specific social actors to produce, guide and maintain meaning for their constituents (Benford and Snow 2000: 613; Kovras and Loizides 2011). Policy-makers, media and even ordinary people deploy simplified mental images to interpret complex social and political events and choose among alternative courses of action (Tetlock 1998: 876).

Framing is composed of two analytical elements. Diagnostic framing stems from the need to identify the cause(s) of the problematic situation and to apportion responsibility/blame. In essence, the present situation is perceived to be unjust and grievances are attributed to the actions/omissions of another agent or, more generally, conditions outside the control of the ‘in-group’ (Gamson 1992). Prognostic framing derives from the need to change the problematic situation by designing a strategy to overcome it (Benford and Snow 2000).
Eleftherotipia and Kathimerini are two widely distributed Greek newspapers. Eleftherotipia is a prestigious left-of-centre newspaper; its readership ranges in age and ideology from students to policy-makers. It covers the activities of new social movements, such as the anti-globalisation movement and the global anti-war campaign. For its part, Kathimerini is a well-respected conservative newspaper. It is read by many centrist readers, and publishes articles representing divergent ideological points of view.

We searched all articles describing or commenting on the Greek riots, commencing the day after the murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos (6 December 2008), believed to be the event triggering the riots, and ending in January 2009 when the violence ceased.

Two broad, but overlapping, diagnostic frames emerge from Eleftherotipia. First, because the murder of the schoolboy and the riots were causally and temporally linked (the violence erupted an hour after the teenager died), primary responsibility for the riots is attributed to the police. The incident is not presented as the act of an individual; rather, the police are held accountable as a repressive institution, and this diagnosis is linked to historical experience. During the first days of rioting, several articles draw parallels with similar incidents of police brutality in the past, some of which resulted in the death of civilians (Antoniadis 2008; Marnellos 2008).

The riots are also viewed through the lens of past experience of the civil war and military dictatorship. As one observer argues, ‘[w]e do not want this state, the deep state, the offspring of Junta . . . that was never purified’ (Aggelopoulos 2008). People confronting complex socio-political phenomena often look to the past to draw parallels and make sense of them. Thus, the newspaper characterises the riots of 2008 as the ‘December of the youth’ – a direct reference to the events of December 1944 in Athens which paved the way for civil war (Sotirhou, 20 December 2008).

In the newspaper, frequent references to the high levels of unemployment, low salaries and poor employment conditions – also known as G700 (Generation 700 Euros) – help to explain the widespread sympathy for the mobilisation of the youth, even when it turned violent (11 December 2008). Given the social conditions which evidently caused the mobilisation, it is not surprising that the riots are linked to acts of resistance during the anti-dictatorial struggle. A former minister who participated in the 1973 Polytechnic uprising is quoted as saying the riots share several similarities with the anti-dictatorial mobilisation (Efthymiou 2008).

Eleftherotipia’s diagnostic framing also refers to the systemic roots of the riots and the structural problems created by capitalism and globalisation. One observer insists that Greek riots are a symptom of a deeper systemic crisis of the ‘values that uphold these institutions, namely the individualistic values of competition and egotism’ (Fotopoulos 2008). Because the heart of the problem is political (globalisation, capitalism, ineffective state, etc.), the newspaper adopts the term ‘uprising’ (εξέγερση) – instead of riots. Almost one-third of the articles we examined contain a subtle reference to the
political causes of the ‘revolt’. Moreover, because of the common structural source of the situation, the paper estimates that the uprising will spill over to other European societies facing similar challenges: ‘The Greek uprising is considered a precursor. Europe lives in fear of a widespread uprising’ (Papanastasoulis 2008). It argues: ‘Alexandros Grigoropoulos should be rightly considered the first victim in our country for the survival of the planet as well as the potential of the youth’ (Pantelakis 2008).

Kathimerini’s framing of the source of the riots both concurs with and diverges from Eleftherotipia. It subscribes to the linkage between the shooting that triggered the riots and the wider political problems (dysfunctional political institutions, corrupt political system and grievances of the youth) but abstains from referring to the phenomenon as an ‘uprising’. Instead, it says: ‘The unfortunate death of their age-mate, armed the hand of the 15-year-old with the stone symbolising the wrath [of youth] for a society that does not give them a ticket to study, to employment or a better life’ (Bistika 2008). The paper also cites high rates of unemployment, low incomes and miserable prospects as partial explanations for the protests.

Still, there are differences in the two frames. While both identify the police as the source of the problem, Kathimerini focuses on the structural weaknesses of this body in maintaining law and order, both at the time of the murder itself and in the ineffective reaction to the ensuing violence. Several articles note the decades-long structural deficiencies of the police, as well as its unprofessional behaviour, with special emphasis on examples of police brutality in the preceding months (Antoniou 2008; Magklinis 2008; Zoulas 2008).

The conservative Kathimerini subscribes to the general diagnostic framing used by Eleftherotipia to identify the role of politics. However, its political sources are primarily domestic, whereas Eleftherotipia directly links the ‘Greek uprising’ to wider phenomena of globalisation and capitalism. Remarkably, both newspapers abstain from prognostic framing. Apart from the subtle qualified tolerance of the protests, and obvious consensus on the need to reform the police, there is little mention of what should be done. Because of the complexity, intensity and duration of the riots, commentators seem reluctant to make recommendations.

In a similar vein, in the television coverage of the December riots, journalists portrayed the three days as an ‘uprising’, subtly legitimising social discontent. At times they almost encouraged young people to join the rioting. In a very popular broadcast, the presenter stressed that the youth became infuriated with the situation in Greece and their rage would stop only through a vision, one that cannot be found in Greece (Lazopoulos 2008). Although most student activism was confined to peaceful marches in protest against police brutality, the focus of prime-time news was on sit-in mobilisations in front of police stations that were marked by abusive language, objects being thrown at guards, and attempts to occupy the police stations. These acts of resistance were presented as normal yet heroic reactions to police brutality. In several documentaries broadcast in the days
following the riots, the violence was ‘explained’ as a response to the ‘violence of school’, the ‘violence of scandals’ and the ‘violence of police in the streets’ (Tsimas 2008).

Greek media framing helps us understand how a culture of sympathy to resistance has been perpetuated. By and large, the Greek media is composed of journalists who came of age during the transition and who tend to reproduce the ‘vocabulary’ of transition. Even the most moderate media outlets subtly supported a framing that posited the riots as a normal reaction to the economic, social, political and policing problems of the country. In short, the media’s role has been to familiarise the public with the use of violence as an acceptable way to settle public disputes.

**‘Ritualisation of Resistance’ in Schools**

This culture of sympathy is reproduced and perpetuated through the ritualisation of acts of resistance in public schools. Greek students become socialised into (often unlawful) acts of resistance with the support of their teachers and parents, making participation in riots seem a rite of passage (Kalyvas 2008). A good example is the phenomenon of ‘school occupation’ as a form of protest. Since the consolidation of democracy, small groups of students have frequently illegally occupied school buildings, stopping classes and preventing the entry of teachers. Students occupying the schools make a number of demands, ranging from changes in the school infrastructure to education reform; hardly coincidentally, waves of occupations coincide with periods of broader educational reform.

What is particularly striking is the support of parents’ associations and teachers’ unions. In early 2008, a few months before the riots, a wave of school occupations took place; several district attorneys demanded the implementation of the law prohibiting unlawful acts, including damage to buildings and infrastructure (Law 2811/2000). The most vocal teachers’ union, the Greek Federation of State School Teachers of Secondary Education (OLME) urged the government to abstain from implementing the law, framing school occupations as a means of ‘social struggle’ that should not be persecuted or penalised (OLME 2010). The Federation officially asked the public prosecutor to abstain from taking any legal action against students arrested in occupied school buildings (OLME 2008). For its part, the Federation of Parents Associations (2008) perceived the decision to prosecute as an effort to ‘persecute’ a noble struggle and ‘terrorise parents, student community and the teachers’. The Association refers to other – unaffiliated – parents who cooperate with the authorities as ‘finks’ (ibid.).

Thus, students receive an early education in resistance practices. Consider the reaction to the proposal to install CCTV cameras in schools in the aftermath of the 2004 Athens Olympics. School chancellors were forced by student and parent associations to ‘rip’ the cameras down, as they were seen as a sign of growing state surveillance (Samatas 2008: 359). It is hardly
surprising, then, that during the December 2008 events, the Greek Teachers’ Federation (DOE) encouraged resistance ‘against the governmental policy of repression’ (Diamandouros 2008). This led to mass demonstrations in front of police stations with students throwing stones and oranges at police officers. As Kalyvas (2008) argues, after intense socialisation into acts of resistance and unlawful protest, riots are a continuation of a ‘duty to resist the authorities’, becoming a rite of passage for youth.

**Resistance: ‘A Winning Formula’**

The practice of resistance is not limited to schools but has become a winning political formula for all sorts of interest groups formulating claims against the state. For the past three decades, numerous interest and civil society groups, ranging from trade unions and teachers’ unions to football fans have successfully deployed unlawful repertoires of protest to formulate claims against the state. Public buildings and ministries have been occupied by professional associations; national motorways have been blocked by farmers and lorry drivers; coordinated action was taken by dockworkers to prohibit thousands of passengers on board ships from disembarking; taxi drivers have blockaded airports and ports nationwide; garbage collectors have occupied garbage dumps for weeks, triggering a major sanitation crisis. This picture of a society composed of ‘spoiler groups’ using unlawful practices to secure their demands/privileges should not be linked exclusively to the economic recession, since these practices were deployed before the sovereign debt crisis, albeit less frequently.

Fundamental tenets were set in the early days of *Metapolitefsi* and the emergence of ‘populism’ as a central ingredient in Greek politics in the early 1980s (Mavrogordatos 1983). At this time, the PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) socialist government successfully used ideology to justify ‘machine politics’, namely the use of state bureaucracy to establish well-entrenched clientelistic relationships (Mavrogordatos 1997). Framed within a wider call for ‘change’, meritocracy was perceived as an undemocratic ‘authoritarian fraud’ that blurred the distinction between the ‘privileged’ and the ‘non-privileged’ (Mavrogordatos 1997: 18). Most Greek political parties have employed populism because the ‘potential immediate beneficiaries are by definition’ more than those who benefit from meritocracy (ibid.: 22). The ‘logic of populism’ has become a well-entrenched feature of the Greek political system; no party can resist its attractiveness, while civil society and labour unions have secured its perpetuation (Sotiropoulos 1995). Greek politicians have borrowed liberally and used EEC/EU funds to perpetuate the system, contributing to the bleak economic predicament of the late 2000s.

Although party penetration (and control) by civil society groups constitutes a common feature of Spanish politics as well, similar forms of collective action have been absent (Gunther and Montero 2009: 177). The explanation for the deployment of the specific repertoire of contention in
Greece can be attributed to the political elites who have been willing to pay the economic cost of accommodating a clientelistic system. This practice has been exercised with such success that it has become a ‘winning political formula’. Illegal actions, disobedience, public disturbance and even violence to protect group interests are seen as a normal extension of the right to protest (Kalyvas 2010a). There are even cases of ‘state sponsored’ acts of resistance. Take, for example, the decision of the president of a regional chamber of commerce in northern Greece to charge the state for printing placards and brochures for a group mobilised around the demand for free transit on national motorways; this group has often occupied toll booths and broken the barriers at them to facilitate free transit (Mandravelis 2011).

A stark illustration of how this winning formula has taken on a life of its own is the recent mobilisation of the inhabitants of Keratea, a small city near Athens. The citizens proactively resisted the state’s effort to construct a rubbish dump. Perceiving the dump as degrading the environment and affecting their quality of living, protestors set fire to construction vehicles and erected massive roadblocks on the highway. The state replied by sending police to guard the construction crews. Anarchist and anti-authority groups joined the protesters, using petrol bombs against the police and constructing a trench across both lanes of the highway (Becatoros 2011). The struggle of the people of Keratea attracted significant media attention and garnered much public sympathy. A number of artistic events were organised; for example, Greek singers participated in a concert paying tribute to the struggle (Eleftherotipia 2011). For almost three months, Keratea was in a state of mini-riot. In the end, police withdrew and the construction of the dump was cancelled, showing that resistance is an effective way to express collective demands. At least in Greece, resistance in general and rioting, in particular, are ‘low cost’ activities.

**Institutionalisation of the Practice of Resistance**

A final mechanism explaining the persistence and perpetuation of resistance practices, including riots, is their *de jure* and *de facto* institutionalisation. The law on university and academic freedom constitutes the most obvious example of *de jure* institutionalisation. The memories of the 1973 Polytechnic events have acquired strong symbolic/emotional salience because they are widely considered to have destabilised the authoritarian regime. And the students’ mobilisation was possible because the Greek universities are protected by asylum law; in other words, universities are safe havens where police intervention is prohibited. Hence, the ‘legitimising moment’ for democracy is directly linked to this institution.

The heroic view of the Polytechnic, coupled with previous experience of violations of fundamental rights and liberties during the dictatorship, has resulted in the (re)establishment of a very liberal institution with provisions safeguarding individual and collective rights: university asylum. In the early
period following the transition, efforts to *de facto* abolish university asylum were fiercely resisted by militant student groups (Psacharopoulos and Kazamias 1980: 130). Ultimately, in 1982 the new socialist government of PASOK, perceived to be the inheritor of the anti-dictatorship tradition, further institutionalised university asylum by incorporating it into Law No.1268 (Art.2).

In the post-authoritarian period, the institutionalisation of the academic asylum law facilitated the reproduction and perpetuation of rioting as a means of expression. Although the Greek constitution, following EU trends, explicitly refers to ‘academic expression’, a very expansive interpretation has been adopted which extends academic expression to include freedom of action within university areas (Panousis 2009). The safe haven offered by universities explains the eruption of riots close to university buildings. It also explains the obvious pattern whereby violent protests follow calls for education reform. Participants take refuge in university buildings in Athens and Salonika which are located within walking distance of riot hot-spots. This creates a steady and predictable link between violent protests and protesters who hide in university buildings.

Greece is not the only country in Southern Europe with a vibrant student movement that resists authoritarianism. In fact, in the late 1950s a vocal student movement spread among Spanish universities – especially in Madrid – composed of the children of both the victors and vanquished of the civil war (Morales 1980). Although academic freedom and institutional autonomy in Spain are constitutionally secured (Art.27(10)), there is no institution similar to the Greek asylum law (Karran 2007). The difference in approach can be attributed to the individual discursive legacies of transition; while in Spain most parties, including the socialist PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol), were committed to a ‘pact of silence’ about the past (Aguilar 2002), in Greece the majority of political parties (especially the Left) sought to capitalise on the past, leading to the institutionalisation of ‘acts of resistance’.

This should be coupled with the fact that violent collective action is a low-cost activity, since few are arrested and even fewer are tried (Kalyvas 2010b). For example, according to the Greek police, between December 2008 and January 2008, there were 420 demonstrations/protests and 602 incidents when public or private property was damaged, but only 188 arrests. Even more striking was the violent reaction to the economic bailout package in early May 2010. A few hooded protestors threw petrol bombs into a bank, causing the death of three clerks; to this day, no one has been held accountable. This points to the (failed) central role of the Greek police in handling violent protests.

As noted, the Greek public perceives the police negatively. According to the 1999 World Values Survey, only 28.1 per cent of Greeks trust the police. Meanwhile, the Spaniards, who had an equally repressive *Guardia Civil* (Civil Guard) during the Francoist years, have remarkable confidence in the
police (54.9 per cent). These findings pose a puzzle for those writing on transitional justice (Linz and Stepan 1996; Sikkink and Wallin 2007), especially as the transition in Greece arguably offered better prospects for reforming the police. The Greek junta was short-lived, and the clean break with the past and the successful settlement of past sources of political contestation (referendum on abolishing the monarchy, legalisation of the Communist Party, etc.) paved the way for an early and successful democratic consolidation (Diamandouros 1997), yet paradoxically this did not lead to the effective reform of specific state institutions, including the police.

Spanish politicians faced a herculean task in attempting to reform and democratise the police. The pacted nature of the transition mentioned above meant that successful reform depended on the proactive consensus of members of the ancien régime, thereby minimising the prospect of police vetting and exclusion of Francoist elements. In sharp contrast to Greece, the socialist PSOE took care not to make the entire police force responsible for the past human rights abuses. Instead a strategic decision was taken to support the police deploying the ‘Law-and-Order frame’ (Cerezales 2010: 438). The path was not easy, and it should be highlighted that the brutality of the Spanish police in the early democratic period far surpassed Greece’s experience. From 1970 to 1995, 94 people were killed by the police during demonstrations or protests (Cerezales 2010: 441). Furthermore, in the 1980s a secret anti-terrorist group (GAL – Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) was organised by the police, in close coordination with several PSOE members, to tackle Basque terrorism. During its campaign, GAL killed, extra-judicially executed and tortured several individuals, some of whom were innocent (Encarnación 2007). If police brutality was the causal factor for violent collective action, one would expect more riots in Spain.

Greek political elites representing parties that suffered severe persecution under authoritarian rule only hesitantly accepted the Greek police as part of the state apparatus, clearly doubting its loyalty to the new democratic game. As a result, the police were placed under close political scrutiny. This is evident from the orientation of the police reforms: the unification of the two police bodies (Gendarmerie and Urban Police) in 1984 and the dependence of the Chief of Police on the designated Minister (Zianikas 1995). Both developments diminished the autonomy of the police and, consequently, its effectiveness. The Minister of Public Order gives the general orders to and provides guidelines for the riot police. Politicians prefer to adopt a defensive position even if this means minimal arrests. This lack of trust in the police (as an institution) is reflected in the denial of the right of the police to establish unions until the mid-1990s, making Greece the only country in the EU where this democratic right was prohibited (Stergioulis 2001: 231). Thus the political elites’ stranglehold led to the growing organisational incompetence of the Greek police.

In this context, rioting is seen as a low risk activity, firstly because of the low number of arrests, but secondly, and more significantly, because of
public sympathy towards protesters and open hostility towards the police, attitudes frequently shared by the politicians who lead the police. An illustrative example is provided by the parliamentary debates on the day after the December 2008 riots, when an MP from the socialist opposition ‘ordered’ the ‘police forces to abstain from using the parliament’s backyard to carry out acts of brutality (against protesters) on the part of police similar to those we watched previously on TV. Today there is a public mobilisation – justified mobilisation – reaction to the brutality that police showed over the last few days’ (8 December 2008: 2947). Interestingly, this politician became the minister mandated to lead the police.

Conclusion

Most theories of violent collective action focus on the nexus between motivation and cost. Although people tend to pursue actions that maximise gains and minimise costs before they act violently, the literature downplays the fact that the concepts of cost/gain are often mediated through culture. In effect, individuals opt for practices with which they are familiar; a formula that was successful in the past will be assumed to be so in the future. The paper shows how a Greek ‘culture of sympathy’ towards acts of resistance to the state has been institutionalised and reproduced.

Surprisingly, the concept of ‘public sympathy’ has received scant attention, even though it affects political outcomes by facilitating or preventing state intervention. Consider the difference between the UK and Greece. In the aftermath of the 2011 London riots, David Cameron stressed that ‘if you are old enough to commit these crimes, you are old enough to face the punishment’ (Guardian 2011). In Greece, meanwhile, the Minister of the Interior said: ‘We prefer a police in a defensive position that effectively protects human rights, rather than adopting an aggressive stance that could harm an individual or, even worse, lead to another death.’

Southern European societies have often been treated as identical cases in the face of the sovereign debt crisis. Yet a comparative study of Greece and Spain shows that, despite their similar background conditions, the two societies deal with these issues in quite different ways. With deep economic recession and severe austerity measures, will protests wax or wane in Greece? It is not overstating the matter to say that Greece is experiencing a traumatic and uncertain ‘second’ transition. In times of crises (or disasters), societies usually look to the past to explain the (institutional, political and social) failure to prevent disaster. This process of political learning depends on the ability of political elites to adapt to new conditions (Bermeo 1992). Arguably, because of the need to reach the twin objectives of debt reduction and broader state reforms, the ability of Greek politicians to distribute resources to accommodate an elite system will shrink. Vocal minority groups will gradually cease to perceive unlawful collective action as a winning political formula, because public sympathy towards, and tolerance
of, acts of resistance will plummet. Ethnographic evidence of ‘critical constituents’, such as shopkeepers in central Athens, could substantiate this argument. Finally, but equally importantly, the fact that politicians have been the target of violent attacks is also expected to strengthen the credibility of the law and order frame.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Neophytos Loizides, Stefan Andreasson, Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Evan Liaras and Elizabeth Thompson for their comments on previous drafts of this article. We would also like to thank the WEP editorial team, and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback.

The research project is implemented within the framework of the Action ‘Supporting Postdoctoral Researchers’ of the Operational Program ‘Education and Lifelong Learning’ Action’s Beneficiary: General Secretariat for Research and Technology), and is co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Greek State.

Note

1. For example, the former London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, subscribed to this reading, blaming the government’s spending cuts for the 2011 London riots (Hughes 2011).

References

Rioting and Anti-Systemic Politics in Southern Europe 723


